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FIVE ANSWERS AND THREE QUESTIONS AFTER
UNITED STATES V. JONES (2012), THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT “GPS CASE”
BENJAMIN J. PRIESTER*
I. Introduction
Each year, the United States Supreme Court’s docket includes a range of
“high profile” cases that attract attention not merely from law professors
and others with an acquired fascination with the Court, but also from a
general audience of law students, lawyers, scholars and commentators on
American politics and society, as well as, occasionally, the public at large.
During the 2011 Term, one of those cases was “the GPS case,” formally
known as United States v. Jones.1 Media coverage of the case spread far
beyond the legal blogosphere to a wide variety of mainstream and popular
sources, both in print and online.2 Many people who had no familiarity with
the legal doctrinal intricacies of Fourth Amendment law nevertheless
waited with bated breath to hear what the Court would say about what
limitations, if any, the Constitution might place on the authority of the
police to use GPS technology for tracking criminal suspects—or, more
broadly, the authority of the Government in general to maintain
surveillance of the public movements of people in everyday life.
When the decision was announced in January 2012, nearly everyone—
from the layperson reading a news update online to the law professor ready
to thoroughly dissect the ramifications of the opinion with a criminal
procedure class—was left underwhelmed by the Court’s resolution of the
case, at least compared to the anticipation beforehand. In two respects, at
least, the Court was unanimous and clear: the Defendant’s argument
prevailed and the Fourth Amendment applied to what the police had done
on the facts of the case.3
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Development, Florida Coastal
School of Law. Thanks to Professor Marc McAllister for his helpful feedback on a draft of
this article.
1. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Case Asks if ‘Big Brother’ Is Spelled GPS, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2011, at A1; Tom Goldstein, Jones Confounds the Press, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 25, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=137791 (discussing print and
online media coverage).
3. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito,
J., concurring in the judgment). Technically speaking, the Court did not hold that both
probable cause and a warrant were required to conduct the GPS surveillance presented on
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Other than that, however, the Court did not provide very much guidance
about the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS surveillance or similar
tracking technologies in the future. The lack of clarity was particularly
acute because the reasoning underlying the Court’s holding revealed a 5-4
split among the Justices4—a division that differed from the stereotypical
perception of the Justices’ ideological divides5—as well as a concurring
opinion that seemingly agreed with both of the other two camps while
simultaneously staking out a position broader than either.6 At first glance
the three opinions revealed a Court seemingly intent on avoiding the
complex and difficult issues of Fourth Amendment rights in a digital,
Internet-interconnected age and putting off these tough judgment calls for
another case on another day.
As is often true of the Court’s decisions, though, the reality is more
nuanced than initial appearances might suggest. While the opinions in
Jones undeniably left open several significant questions for resolution in
future cases, they actually provided answers to a number of subsidiary
questions. Consequently, it is worth taking the time to carefully consider
not only the issues the Jones decision leaves open, but also the questions it
answers.
II. A Brief Background to Jones
Others have thoroughly described and analyzed the factual and Fourth
Amendment doctrinal background to Jones; there is no need to repeat it in
great detail here.7 The important point, for present purposes, is that legal
the facts of the case; the only issue before the Court was whether the surveillance constituted
a “search” at all for Fourth Amendment purposes. See infra Part III.A.; see also Tom
Goldstein, Why Jones Is Still Less of a Pro-Privacy Decision than Most Thought,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=138066.
4. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito,
J., concurring in the judgment).
5. The majority opinion by Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor. See id. at 949 (majority opinion). Justice
Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice
Alito wrote the opinion concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan. Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, the Justices’
perspectives in Jones did not correspond to a “political” or “party line” voting alignment,
compared to how other decisions are perceived. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
6. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Stephanie G. Forbes, Following You
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scholars and other commentators had known for some time that a “GPS
case” likely would have to make its way to the Court, and they had given a
great deal of thought to both how the Court should approach the difficult
doctrinal issues and how the Court should resolve them.
Doctrinally, the background to Jones was relatively straightforward, at
least as constitutional law and Fourth Amendment controversies go. When
the police have probable cause and obtain a search warrant, they can
investigate just about anything—enter and thoroughly inspect the contents
of a home, demand access to a bank vault or combination safe, or examine
the digital files on a computer, to name just a few examples.8 Without a
warrant or probable cause, however, their authority to conduct
investigations is far more constrained.9 More specifically, if the police
investigative activity qualifies as a “search” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures,10 then
that activity usually will be unconstitutional unless the police already had
probable cause and a warrant before acting.11 A variety of investigative
tactics do not qualify as “searches” under the Court’s decisions, however,
and consequently these techniques may be used to gather the evidence
needed to establish the probable cause required for obtaining a warrant.12 In
a pair of cases in the early 1980s, United States v. Karo and United States v.
Knotts, the Court considered the use of “beepers” to track the movements of
vehicles on public roadways.13 Comparatively simplistic technology in
today’s hindsight, such a beeper device emitted a radio-signal pulse at
regular intervals and could only be followed manually by a police officer
Here, There, and Everywhere: An Investigation of GPS Technology, Privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011); Ian Herbert, Note, Where
We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology and the Implications on
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442 (2011); Recent Case,
Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—D.C. Circuit Deems Warrantless Use of GPS
Device an Unreasonable Search, 124 HARV. L. REV. 827 (2011).
8. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 3.3-3.4
(Thomson Reuters, 5th ed. 2009) (1985).
9. See generally id. §§ 3.7-3.10 (discussing doctrinal limitations on searches or
seizures conducted without probable cause, without a warrant, or with neither).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See generally 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.01 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing conceptual debate over the socalled “warrant requirement”).
12. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2.
13. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983).
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with a signal detector who stayed within signal range to avoid losing track
of the device.14 In each case, the Court held that this investigative tactic was
not a Fourth Amendment “search” and therefore was permissibly conducted
by the police in a preliminary investigation without first establishing
probable cause or obtaining a warrant.15
By the turn of the twenty-first century, more sophisticated technology
enabled more detailed and extensive tracking of public movements. In
Jones itself, the police attached a small GPS device to the undercarriage of
a Jeep Grand Cherokee; using access to satellites and cellular phone
networks, the device transmitted its location to a police computer at
frequent intervals, producing over 2000 pages of location-information data
in four weeks.16 Rather than requiring constant, real-time monitoring by an
officer, the police could simply view the ongoing log of the device’s
location transmissions at any time.17 At Jones’s trial on federal narcotics
conspiracy charges, the Government used the four-week log of Jones’s
public movements to establish his connections to various locations and
individuals involved in the conspiracy.18 On appeal from his conviction,
Jones argued that this evidence should have been excluded at trial as the
fruit of an unconstitutional “search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment
because the surveillance had not been conducted pursuant to a valid
warrant.19 The D.C. Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction, setting up a
circuit split with other federal appellate courts.20 The Government filed a

14. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 707 n.1, 708-10; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-79.
15. Karo, 468 U.S. at 711-13; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. But see Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-18
(holding that monitoring a beeper when it was present inside a home constituted a “search”).
16. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub
nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. The police actually obtained a warrant to attach and monitor the
GPS device, but they failed to comply with its terms. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 n.11
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). In the appellate litigation, the Government conceded
the noncompliance and argued that no “search” had occurred. Id. at 948 & n.1 (majority
opinion).
20. Compare Maynard, 615 F.3d at 568 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment
applied to lengthy, continuous GPS surveillance of public movements), with United States v.
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that no reasonable expectation
of privacy existed in movements made on public streets, including when monitored by GPS
surveillance), and United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (same, at least
when “mass surveillance” was not involved).
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petition for certiorari, which was granted on June 27, 2011.21 This action
caught the attention of scholars and commentators, and the briefing in the
case attracted significant amicus curiae participation, reflecting the
conventional wisdom of the case’s importance.22
The oral argument in Jones—which took place on November 8, 2011—
confirmed that the Justices themselves also recognized the importance of
the case and the difficult doctrinal issues it presented.23 On the one hand,
the Justices expressed clear skepticism about the Government’s position,
which seemingly amounted to the Orwellian proposition that law
enforcement can track all the public movements of every American at all
times without any limitations.24 On the other hand, the Justices equally
struggled to figure out how they could fit open movements on public roads
back inside the doctrinal box of reasonable expectations of privacy.25
Afterward, the most likely solution seemed to be that the Court would split
the difference—a modest win for the Government or for the defendant,
21. See United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064, 3064 (2011) (“Petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted.
In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and
argue the following question: ‘Whether the government violated respondent’s Fourth
Amendment rights by installing the GPS tracking device on his vehicle without a valid
warrant and without his consent.’”).
22. See, e.g., Clare Cochrane, Supreme Court Takes D.C. Case Debating Warrantless
GPS Use, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A4; Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Review
Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 27, 2011, 10:46
AM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supreme-court-agrees-to-review-case-on-gps-and-thefourth-amendment/; see also United States v. Jones, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.
com/case-files/cases/united-states-v-jones/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (listing 13 amicus
briefs filed in Jones).
23. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
24. See, e.g., id. at 9-10, 21-23; id. at 10 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your
answer is yes, you could tomorrow decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our
cars, follow us for a month; no problem under the Constitution?”); id. at 13 (“JUSTICE
BREYER: . . . . And no one, or at least very rarely, sends human beings to follow people 24
hours a day. That occasionally happens. But with the machines, you can. So, if you win, you
suddenly produce what sounds like 1984 from their brief.”).
25. See, e.g., id. at 10-11, 35-45; id. at 21 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . I give you
that, that it’s in public. Does the reasonable expectation of privacy trump that fact? In other
words, if we ask people, do you think . . . it violates your right to privacy to have this kind of
information acquired, and everybody says yes, is it a response that, no, that takes place in
public, or is it simply the reasonable expectation of privacy regardless of the fact that it takes
place in public?”).
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within a doctrinal constraint defining some outer boundary to either lengthy
GPS surveillance or limited privacy expectations in public movements,
respectively.26 But even that outcome probably would have required at least
some modification of preexisting doctrinal principles, and the oral argument
showed that the Court had no clear ideas about how to accomplish that step
without opening any number of Pandora’s boxes or risking a variety of
slippery slopes.27
For that reason, most observers expected the Court to take months to
decide the case.28 I told both my fall and spring sections of Criminal
Procedure that I anticipated a decision late in the Term, possibly even after
the spring semester final exam in early May. As recently as the Friday
before the Court’s decision was announced on Monday, January 23, 2012,29
I confidently predicted to a colleague that the only way the decision would
come down anytime soon was if the Court punted on resolving all of the
difficult and interesting problems. Which is, of course, exactly what the
Court did.
Nevertheless, this does not mean there is nothing interesting in the Jones
decision, or that it provides no insight into how the Court is likely to
approach the difficult issues when they recur in a future case. Yes, the
Court did kick the can down the road and put off facing the most
challenging aspects to another day. But this is hardly the first time the
Justices have done that.30 Fortunately, the opinions in Jones do provide
some answers even as they leave open other questions.

26. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: For GPS, Get a Warrant, SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov. 8, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=131423.
27. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23.
28. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Reflections on the Oral Argument in United States v. Jones, the
GPS Fourth Amendment Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://
www.volokh.com/2011/11/08/reflections-on-the-oral-argument-in-united-states-v-jones-thegps-fourth-amendment-case/ (assessing oral argument as indicating that “the outcome was
too close to call”); Conor McEvily, Wednesday Round-Up, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2011,
12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/wednesday-round-up-109/ (linking to
numerous reactions in the media to the oral argument in Jones).
29. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
30. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: Judicial Review, Due
Process, and the Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 39
(2005) (discussing several significant constitutional issues left unresolved by the Court’s
decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), and proposing doctrinal resolutions to
them).
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III. The Answers
Frustrating as it can be for scholars, lower court judges, and law students
when the Court issues a narrow holding with sweeping dicta, the opinions
in Jones in fact reveal a number of embedded nuances that are surprisingly
interesting, and perhaps even helpful. In analyzing Jones and assessing its
implications for the future, it is important not to lose sight of the answers
the decision actually does offer.
A. The Court (Slightly) Modified the Doctrinal Definition of a “Search.”
Oddly enough, this aspect of the Jones decision is simultaneously the
most interesting and the least important. It is the most interesting because it
marked the first change in this particular subset of search doctrine in fortyfive years. But it is the least important because the narrowness of the
addition to search doctrine gave it minimal practical scope.
It has long been Fourth Amendment orthodoxy, grounded in the
Constitution’s text, that the Amendment does not prohibit unreasonable law
enforcement investigative activity of all kinds.31 Rather, it governs only
those police activities that qualify as “searches” or “seizures”32—just as the
First Amendment only protects “speech” and the Eighth Amendment only
proscribes cruel and unusual “punishments.”33 For much of its interpretive
history, the doctrinal definition of “search” relied upon principles of the law
of property—a “search” involved a physical intrusion into a person’s
property rights.34 In the famous 1967 Katz decision, the Court abrogated the
doctrine’s reliance on property law and adopted a new definition based in
principles of privacy—a “search” involved an intrusion into a person’s
31. See, e.g., 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 11, § 6.01 (“[I]f the police activity is
not a ‘search’ at all (or a ‘seizure’ . . . ), the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to the
governmental conduct.”).
32. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-25 (1991) (holding that foot
pursuit of a yet-to-be-captured fleeing suspect was not a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment
purposes); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (holding that removal and
inspection of contents of defendant’s curbside trash was not a “search” for Fourth
Amendment purposes).
33. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517-18 (2001) (holding that application
of a wiretapping statute to prohibit media reporting of contents obtained through illegal
interception of a phone call would constitute unconstitutional infringement of “speech”
under the First Amendment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (holding that
conditions of a prisoner’s confinement constituted “punishment” for Eighth Amendment
purposes only when prison officials acted with deliberate indifference).
34. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-32 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 352-53 (1967); see also 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 11, § 6.02.
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reasonable expectation of privacy.35 Since Katz, the Court has applied this
doctrinal definition to numerous police investigative activities, including
aerial flyovers of backyards of homes,36 digging through curbside trash,37
and canine sniffs of airport luggage or traffic-stopped cars.38 This doctrinal
definition was briefed and argued in Jones,39 and five Justices wrote or
joined opinions specifically discussing its application to the GPS
surveillance at issue.40
But the opinion of the Court in Jones, with the support of five Justices,
did not use the preexisting Katz definition as the basis for its holding.41
Instead, the Court added a new component to its doctrinal definition of a
Fourth Amendment “search”: an activity involving (1) an enumerated
protected category from the text of the Amendment, (2) a physical
intrusion, and (3) a purpose to obtain information.42 The Court repeatedly
emphasized that this new definitional component is a supplement to Katz,
not a replacement for it.43 Thus, police investigative activities that qualify
as a “search” under Katz continue to be governed by the Fourth
Amendment after Jones. The additional doctrinal component under Jones
reaches situations where the defendant otherwise would lose under the Katz
definition.
First, the Jones addition is limited to the enumerated protected categories
in the Fourth Amendment: “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”44 The
Jones Court quickly noted that an automobile was indisputably an “effect”
for Fourth Amendment purposes, and consequently did not elaborate on the
potential outer contours of the scope of these four terms.45 Many police
35. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally 1
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 11, §§ 6.03-6.04; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2.
36. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
37. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
38. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (canine sniff of stopped
automobile); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (canine sniff of airport
luggage).
39. See generally Brief for the United States, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 3561881; Brief for Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No.
10-1259), 2011 WL 4479076.
40. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957, 962-64
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. See id. at 949-50 (majority opinion); id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 951 (majority opinion).
43. See id. at 950, 951 n.5, 953-54.
44. See id. at 953 n.8 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45. Id. at 949.
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investigations in a high-tech society, though, will implicate attempts to
gather evidence from inside individual’s homes (“houses”), as well as from
their computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices (“papers” or
“effects” or both)—and possibly, as technology advances, even remotely
investigating the body itself (“persons”).46 Consequently, Jones will reach
as far as these enumerated protected categories are expanded or contracted
by the Court.
Second, the Jones addition requires a physical trespass into or upon the
relevant protected category on the facts of each case.47 The Court
acknowledged that this marked a return to the pre-Katz version of Fourth
Amendment protection, but grounded its justification in an originalist
argument that physical trespasses upon persons, houses, papers, and effects
were inherent in the scope of Fourth Amendment protections at the time of
the Founding.48 In particular, the Court emphasized that the Jones addition
was necessary to preserve the scope of rights originally guaranteed by the
Amendment.49 Otherwise, the Katz definition would create the potential for
reducing rights against physical intrusions even as it offers expanded
protection against non-physical investigations.50 Thus, whatever might be
the scope of Katz’s protection against various forms of electronic
surveillance and technological snooping, the Court maintained that Jones
would ensure that the police will not “usurp” a person’s own property and
exploit it “for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him.”51

46. See, e.g., Amy Christey, Law Enforcement’s Use of Nanotechnology—Science Fact
or Science Fiction?, SHERIFF, Jan. 1, 2010, at 70; Jamie Schram & Bill Sanderson, NYPD
New “Wave” of Friskless Search, N.Y. POST, Jan. 18, 2012, at 7 (“The Defense Department
is helping the NYPD develop the technology, which detects and distinguishes heat and other
radiation emanating from people and objects they are carrying—including guns and
explosives, said NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly. The technology has proven effective from
15 feet away, although police hope to expand its range to 75 feet.”); see also Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (police use of thermal imaging device to investigate a home);
United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008) (border agents’ inspection of contents
of laptop computer), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.
2008).
47. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50 & n.3, 951 n.5.
48. See id. at 949-50.
49. See id. at 953.
50. See id. at 950 & n.3, 953; see also infra Part III.D.
51. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The Government usurped Jones’
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy
interests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection.”).
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Third, the trespass into an enumerated category must have been
investigatory in nature.52 At one point the Court described this requirement
as a trespass “for the purpose of obtaining information”;53 in another
passage, the Court called it “an attempt to find something or to obtain
information.”54 Regardless of the exact wording, the key point is that mere
trespass alone is not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment; the existence
of a tort-law or property-law trespass must be accompanied by some
governmental exploitation of the intrusion to seek to uncover evidence or
discover facts.55 Likewise, the police need not have succeeded in finding
what they sought; it is enough that the trespass was carried out with an
investigatory purpose.56
Thus, after Jones, defendants will now have two doctrinal bases to
challenge a law enforcement investigation: either as an invasion of a
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz or as a trespassory
investigative intrusion upon an enumerated protected category under Jones.
If either is present, then a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred and, at
least presumptively, probable cause and a warrant were required.57
52. Id. at 949 (majority opinion).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 951 n.5.
55. See id.
56. See id. By defining a Fourth Amendment “search” of an enumerated protected
category to require both a technical trespass and an attempt to obtain information, the Court
also resolved what could have been potentially broad ramifications for civil liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, in addition to application of its new definition under the exclusionary rule.
Longstanding precedent made clear that a technical trespass alone did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation, see, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958-61 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing and discussing cases), which meant that mere trespass therefore was not
actionable under § 1983. By requiring the investigative intent as well as the technical
trespass, Justice Scalia’s new additional definition in Jones preserves this principle because
trespass alone still will not be enough to constitute a “search” for Fourth Amendment
purposes. See id. at 951 n.5 (majority opinion). Likewise, the requirement of a trespass in
addition to an attempt to obtain information parallels the longstanding doctrinal result under
Katz, where an attempt to obtain information by investigative techniques not involving
physical intrusion or trespass does not violate the Fourth Amendment—for purposes of
either the exclusionary rule or § 1983 remedy—unless there is an intrusion into a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See id.; see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2626-27,
2629-30 (2010) (addressing a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim by a police department
employee arguing that his employer had violated his reasonable expectation of privacy by
reading his text messages on a department-issued phone).
57. But see Goldstein, supra note 3 (noting that the Jones decision did not preclude the
adoption of Fourth Amendment requirements less stringent than probable cause or a warrant
in a future case).
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On the other hand, the practical impact of the Jones addition is likely to
be minimal. By its terms, the Jones definition only restricts physical
investigatory invasions.58 Even if the principle subsequently is extended to
more metaphorical invasions—such as installation of spyware into the
operating software on a computer or smartphone—the reality remains that a
great deal of the most helpful investigatory techniques in the digital age can
be accomplished without ever making contact, either physical or electronic,
with the person or property under investigation. For example, red-light
cameras on streets and security cameras on buildings are purely external,
and real-time continuous aerial observation is probably closer to feasible
availability than most Americans realize.59 Functionally, these technologies
could provide exactly the same movement-pattern data as the GPS device
did in Jones, but without any physical trespass of the automobile—as the
Jones Court itself admitted.60 Similarly, the third-party doctrine likely
abrogates the need for technological intrusions into physical property or
personal Internet accounts to obtain many types of information being
sought by police.61 Just like the phone numbers dialed or bank transactions
undertaken in an earlier era,62 online activities or content hidden from the
public at large are nevertheless revealed to third-party service providers.
Consequently, for example, the police would have no need to examine the
physical smartphone itself when they could readily acquire the identical
backup contacts list maintained by Android’s Gmail or Apple’s iCloud
synergies. Likewise, investigators could bypass any need to hack a
Facebook or Photobucket account’s personal password by obtaining access
to the hosted content directly from the website operators.
In an age when law enforcement can conduct an investigation of
incredible breadth and depth without any trespassory intrusions, the
practical value of the limited Jones addition is likely to be small. The Jones
test may decide the outlier cases and slightly constrain the use of certain
investigative technology the police might otherwise be inclined to deploy,63
58. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
59. See, e.g., Eyes in the Sky, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 8, 2012, at A1, available at 2012
WLNR 20754784 (discussing increasing use of drones and other unmanned aircraft for
public safety and law enforcement purposes within the United States).
60. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
61. See infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing the third-party doctrine and its implications).
62. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) (phone numbers); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976) (bank records).
63. For example, tiny radio-frequency identification (RFID) microchips can allow easy
wireless tracking of the location of the object to which the chip is attached. See, e.g., Nancy
J. King, When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped—Finding E.U.-U.S. Solutions to Protect
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but the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test will continue to do the
doctrinal work of determining which police investigative techniques trigger
the Fourth Amendment.
B. Kyllo Was Not a Fluke . . .
Prior to Jones, the last case to present the Court with the question of how
to apply the Fourth Amendment doctrinal definition of “search” to police
use of advanced surveillance technology was Kyllo v. United States,
involving police observation of the heat signature of a home with a thermal
imager.64 In both Kyllo and Jones, the Government argued that the
technological devices only facilitated the observation of information
already inevitably disclosed to the public by the individual—the home’s
waste heat in Kyllo65 and the car’s public movements in Jones.66 Similarly,
the defendants in each case argued that the technological sensory
enhancements provided by the devices enabled the police to successfully
gather information they could not have gathered on their own—the relative
heat differentials of different rooms in the home in Kyllo67 and the errorfree detailed log of a month’s travels in Jones.68 Ultimately, the
Government lost both cases in opinions for the Court written by Justice
Scalia that carried only 5-4 support for his analysis of Fourth Amendment
“search” doctrine.69
Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo nominally applied
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test for determining whether a
Fourth Amendment “search” had occurred,70 the rationale of the opinion
marked a radical departure from the typical reasoning of the Court’s Katz
decisions. Rather than undertaking a normative inquiry into whether society
would expect privacy from the challenged government intrusion,71 Justice
Consumer Privacy and Facilitate Mobile Commerce, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
107 (2008) (describing benefits and risks of RFID chips installed in mobile phones). In light
of the Jones test, though, physically attaching such a device to a person’s clothes or property
for investigatory purposes would constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.
64. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
65. See id. at 35-38; see also id. at 42-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012).
67. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39-40.
68. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948-49.
69. See id. at 947, 952; Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 29, 40.
70. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
71. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (concluding that
defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy against squeezing of his duffel bag luggage
aboard passenger bus); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (concluding that
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Scalia’s Kyllo opinion engaged in an originalist inquiry into the scope of
common law rights of privacy in the home at the time of the Fourth
Amendment’s adoption.72 Concluding that investigating information about
the interior of a home would have required a search warrant at common
law, Justice Scalia then applied that principle to hold that the police could
not simply deploy the use of advanced technology to evade those
longstanding common law protections and obtain the same information
without first getting a warrant.73 Only if the sensory-enhancement device
was in general public use—such that privacy could not be reasonably
expected against its use (by anyone, whether police officer or private
citizen) due to its pervasiveness—would the technological intrusion into the
home not constitute a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.74 The
four-Justice dissent, written by Justice Stevens, rejected this originalist
approach to Katz and concluded that the defendant could not reasonably
expect that the waste heat generated by his home would not be
technologically observed.75
After Kyllo was handed down, the decision’s ramifications for future
investigations and suppression-motion litigation were unclear. Some
commentators suggested that Justice Scalia’s originalist analysis only
provided idiosyncratically strong protection for homes, and that thermal
imagers and other sensory-enhancement devices would not qualify as
“searches” when used to observe less-protected areas like automobiles or
airport luggage76—a view bolstered by the Court’s 2005 decision in
Caballes, which upheld the narcotics-detection canine sniff of an
automobile during a lawful traffic stop.77 Other commentators maintained
defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy against removal and inspection of
contents of his curbside trash).
72. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35 & n.2, 37-38.
73. See id. at 40.
74. Id. at 34, 40.
75. See id. at 41-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 116-23 (2002) (discussing Kyllo’s
emphasis on facts involving a home); David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz,
and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 190-201 (2002) (same). Professor Maclin concludes
that “[i]f the Court’s past precedents are predictive of future results, the odds are good that
Kyllo’s protective reach will be confined to the home.” Maclin, supra, at 117-18.
77. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). On the other hand, the full
implications of Caballes are clouded by the Court’s acknowledgement that the unique nature
of canine sniffs may distinguish them from other forms of technological sensory
enhancement. Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“Thus, the
manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less
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that Kyllo’s principal rationale was to constrain the authority of the police
to deploy non-public technologies in preliminary investigations, prior to
building evidence to support a finding of probable cause.78 This perspective
was grounded in earlier decisions such as those involving aerial flyovers
and physical manipulation of bus passengers’ luggage, which relied on the
proposition that society’s reasonable expectations of privacy depend on
ordinarily occurring behavior in everyday life, rather than what actions are
hypothetically possible for another person to take.79 The conventional
wisdom, though, held that the important part of Kyllo was its analysis of
how to treat advanced sensory-enhancing technologies for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment “search” definition, rather than its originalist
methodology in assessing the scope of Fourth Amendment rights.80
Yet in Jones, Justice Scalia once again persuaded a majority of the Court
to join an originalist analysis of how the Fourth Amendment should apply
to advanced technology.81 Concluding that the application of the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test was too complicated and
indeterminate when applied to GPS surveillance,82 Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion again turned to the basic foundational principles of common law
search authority at the time of the Founding.83 Just as the Kyllo opinion
found that investigating the interior of a home would have required a
warrant at common law,84 so too the Jones opinion found that it would have
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item. . . . In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis.”). But see
Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564, 2013 WL 1196577 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding that a
canine sniff at the front door of a home constituted a “search” and distinguishing Caballes in
part based on Kyllo).
78. Sklansky, supra note 76, at 147 (“Kyllo treats the home as a special place for Fourth
Amendment purposes—hardly a novel proposition for the Supreme Court, but one that
throws into doubt not only the reasoning of Katz, as it usually has been understood, but also
the narrow holding of the case, that electronic surveillance of telephone conversations
constitutes a ‘search.’ I argue that the solution lies in recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects communications as well as places—or, to use a modern metaphor, that
virtual places as well as physical places can receive Fourth Amendment protection.”); see
also id. at 196-201 (arguing that Kyllo’s impact should not be limited to use of technology to
investigate homes).
79. See infra Part IV.A.
80. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 76, at 66-71 (emphasizing Kyllo’s adoption of a brightline rule as the important feature of the decision).
81. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-51 (2012).
82. See id. at 954.
83. See id. at 949-51.
84. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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been a clear violation of common law principles to obtain information from
an individual’s automobile—indisputably his personal “effects” as
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment—by means of trespassing upon it.85
Justice Scalia conceded that the Katz test was still necessary to deal with
investigations not involving physical trespass upon enumerated protected
categories, but insisted that the additional Jones test was necessary “at a
minimum” to preserve the same scope of rights originally guaranteed by the
Amendment.86 Similar to Kyllo, the four-Justice concurring-in-thejudgment opinion in Jones, written by Justice Alito, rejected an originalist
approach to advanced-technology cases and insisted that Katz was the
appropriate test.87 That opinion also took issue with Justice Scalia’s
originalist analysis on the merits and included one of the most amusing
footnotes in recent Fourth Amendment case law.88
Although Justice Scalia’s originalist opinions in Kyllo and Jones stand as
outliers in the broad span of Fourth Amendment “search” definition cases,
the analysis in Jones probably does save Kyllo from being relegated to the
status of a decisional fluke. Ultimately, their importance may not be in the
originalist methodology as such—particularly as the Court continues to deal
with the impact of emerging technologies, the likes of which could not have
been contemplated in the era of the Founding—but rather in serving as a
reminder that the core principles of the Fourth Amendment should continue
to be enforced even as society, technology, and legal principles evolve.89
C. . . . But Justice Scalia Still Has Trouble Holding Votes for His Analysis.
Justice Scalia has been a controversial and polarizing figure for nearly
three decades; his views on constitutional interpretation and his opinions in
decided cases have been praised, criticized, and evaluated in a wide range

85. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-51.
86. See id. at 950 & n.3, 953-54.
87. See id. at 958-61 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
88. See id. at 958 (“Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the
movements of the coach’s owner?”); id. at 958 n.3 (“The Court suggests that something like
this might have occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a
very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and
patience.”).
89. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (restoring the core principles of
the Confrontation Clause to the Court’s doctrine); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 178-95 (2001) (arguing for a “paradigm
case interpretation” of the Constitution).
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of areas of constitutional law. This has certainly been true in criminal
procedure, where Justice Scalia has a particularly interesting track record.
In some doctrinal areas, Justice Scalia has been stuck in the mode of
perpetual dissenter—or at least perpetual critic—when he has been unable
to persuade a majority of the Court to his viewpoint. For example, Justice
Scalia has been sharply critical of the several doctrines often referred to as
“prophylactic rules” subordinate to the Self-Incrimination Clause. Most
famously, he supported the call for overruling Miranda in the years leading
up to Dickerson v. United States, often in agreement with two or three of
his colleagues.90 When Dickerson was decided, however, only Justice
Thomas joined him in dissent91—and Chief Justice Rehnquist not only
defected from their longtime mutual criticisms of Miranda, but actually
wrote the opinion reaffirming the warning-waiver framework.92 Similarly
over Justice Scalia’s strident objections,93 the Court has continued to
reaffirm the Griffin doctrine, which prohibits an adverse inference at trial
from the defendant’s exercise of his Self-Incrimination Clause privilege not
to testify.94 While his critiques were not without merit,95 the other Justices
have shown little willingness to join his perspective.
In several significant areas of criminal procedure though, Justice Scalia
has, in recent years, successfully transformed dissenting arguments into
controlling doctrinal holdings for the Court. In the constitutional law of
sentencing, Justice Scalia led the charge to use the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial as the doctrinal basis to impose restrictions on the impact of
judicial fact-finding in the sentencing hearing.96 What began in his dissents
in cases involving the application of enhanced statutory maximum
sentences ultimately became the Apprendi rule, which led to the
invalidation of the mandatory effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in

90. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450-57 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing prior Miranda precedent, both before and after Justice Scalia joined the Court).
91. See id. at 444.
92. See id. at 431-32 (majority opinion).
93. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-41 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 327-30 (majority opinion).
95. See id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The illogic of the Griffin line is plain, for it
runs exactly counter to normal evidentiary inferences: If I ask my son whether he saw a
movie I had forbidden him to watch, and he remains silent, the import of his silence is
clear.”).
96. See Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of
Conviction, and the Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 873 (2004).
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Booker and the return of significant judicial discretion at sentencing.97
Under the Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia also leveraged previous
dissents98 into his majority opinion in Crawford v. Washington, which
reinvigorated the constitutional constraints on the admissibility of hearsay
evidence at criminal trials.99 In later cases, the Crawford rule invalidated
longstanding procedures such as the admission of lab reports without
appearances by the scientists who conducted the tests.100 And in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Scalia’s earlier criticisms of flaws in the
rule authorizing warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest played a
significant role in the Court’s opinion in Gant, which dramatically reduced
the scope of authorized search authority.101 In adopting Justice Scalia’s
analysis in each of these instances, the Court either overtly overruled
precedent or significantly repudiated prior understanding.102
Yet as the case law in these areas has further developed, Justice Scalia
often has witnessed the Court stray from his vision of the appropriate reach
of the new doctrines. In sentencing, Justice Scalia’s viewpoint garnered five
total votes to invalidate the New Jersey sentencing regime in Apprendi,103
and the same Justices joined him in striking down the mandatory federal
97. See Benjamin J. Priester, The Canine Metaphor and the Future of Sentencing
Reform: Dogs, Tails, and the Constitutional Law of Wagging, 60 SMU L. REV. 209 (2007).
98. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Confrontation Clause requires specific trial procedures which cannot be subject to
limitation by balancing-of-interests doctrinal tests); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
358-66 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
existing Confrontation Clause precedents, including particularly Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980), needed to be revisited and overruled). Justice Scalia joined in Justice Thomas’s
White opinion. See White, 502 U.S. at 358.
99. See 541 U.S. 36, 42-69 (2004).
100. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
101. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342-44 (2009) (citing and discussing Thornton
v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625-32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)); id. at
351-52 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 348 n.9 (“Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion also accuses us of
‘overrul[ing]’ Belton and Thornton . . . ‘even though respondent Gant has not asked us to do
so.’ Contrary to that claim, the narrow reading of Belton we adopt today is precisely the
result Gant has urged.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“I dissent from the Court’s decision to
overrule Ohio v. Roberts.”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 n.13 (2000) (“The
principal dissent accuses us of today ‘overruling McMillan.’ We do not overrule McMillan.
We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe
than the statutory maximum . . . .” (citation omitted)).
103. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468. The majority opinion in Apprendi was written by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas. Id.
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guidelines in Booker—but only three others agreed with his approach to the
appropriate remedy as a matter of statutory interpretation on the issue of
severability.104 In later cases, Justice Scalia continued to urge a view of the
Sixth Amendment constraints on fact-finding at sentencing that no longer
holds a majority.105 The same occurred under the Confrontation Clause,
where the Court’s interpretation of Crawford diverged from Justice Scalia’s
understanding to the point that, in Michigan v. Bryant, he found himself
dissenting about the application of a doctrine he created.106 Although it is
too soon to know the future course of the Gant rule and related doctrines
involving searches incident to arrest, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Gant does not bode well for his control of the doctrine’s shape.107
In large part, this inability to hold votes for his analysis may flow from
Justice Scalia’s consistent refusal to clearly define the doctrinal tests he
intends to adopt, instead relying on generalities. In the Apprendi line of
cases, for example, the Court declared that the Sixth Amendment requires
the jury to perform the fact-finding which produces or increases the
“statutory maximum” sentence to which the defendant is exposed.108 While
this principle was easy to apply to multi-tiered penalty provisions, its
104. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005); see also Benjamin J.
Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy Nullification” and Other Surreal
Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 32-33
(2011) (discussing the Court’s fragmented opinions and analyses in Booker); Priester, supra
note 97, at 227-34 (same).
105. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 173 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Priester, supra note 104, at 13-14, 33-35 (discussing cases).
106. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In its
vain attempt to make the incredible plausible, however—or perhaps as an intended second
goal—today’s opinion distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a
shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort.
Because I continue to adhere to the Confrontation Clause that the People adopted, as
described in Crawford v. Washington, I dissent.” (citation omitted)); see also Marc
McAllister, Evading Confrontation: From One Amorphous Standard to Another, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 473, 526 (2012) (arguing that Bryant undercut Crawford by
reintroducing a malleable doctrinal standard that is easily subject to evasion).
107. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 354 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“No other Justice, however,
shares my view that application of Chimel in this context should be entirely abandoned. It
seems to me unacceptable for the Court to come forth with a 4-to-1-to-4 opinion that leaves
the governing rule uncertain. I am therefore confronted with the choice of either leaving the
current understanding of Belton and Thornton in effect, or acceding to what seems to me the
artificial narrowing of those cases adopted by JUSTICE STEVENS. . . . [T]he former opens the
field to what I think are plainly unconstitutional searches—which is the greater evil. I
therefore join the opinion of the Court.”).
108. See Priester, supra note 96, at 884.
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application was less clear when mapped over to mandatory sentencing
guidelines systems—and even less clear in its implications for the
legitimate scope of appellate review of sentencing determinations made by
trial judges.109 By not clearly defining what he meant by “statutory
maximum”—or perhaps a principle even broader than that—Justice Scalia
could not maintain the solidity of the doctrine he had meant to create.
Similarly, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Crawford was
notoriously bold in refusing to actually define which forms of hearsay count
as “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford’s revived prohibition.110 Given
that, it is hardly surprising that the majority in Bryant interpreted that
concept differently than Justice Scalia himself.111 The Gant opinion, too,
included a turn of phrase which has provoked much consternation for its
lack of clarity.112 It is not difficult to see why Justice Scalia might have
difficulty holding the votes for his analysis when it is not clear what the
other Justices really agreed to in the first place.113
These same sorts of patterns appear to have occurred in Jones. In several
cases previously, Justice Scalia criticized the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test as unclear and hopelessly interchangeable with the policy
preferences of judges.114 Prior to Jones, Justice Scalia had found almost no
support on the Court for overruling or significantly modifying Katz.115 Even
by pitching the Jones trespassory investigative intrusion test as a
supplement to Katz, he was still only able to persuade four other Justices to

109. See Priester, supra note 104, at 5-35; Priester, supra note 97, at 213-26.
110. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“We leave for another day
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”).
111. Compare Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156-62 (evaluating “primary purpose of the
interrogation” to determine whether hearsay statement was testimonial), with id. at 1168-72
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining why declarant’s intent should determine whether hearsay
statement was testimonial).
112. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (“[W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” (quoting Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))).
113. Or perhaps the opacity of the doctrinal statement was necessary to pull together the
votes in the first place. That is, it is possible that if Justice Scalia had straightforwardly
stated his views, they would not have gained five votes even in the initial opinions like
Apprendi or Crawford. If that is true, though, then Justice Scalia’s views are even less
influential in these doctrines than they otherwise appear.
114. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
115. For example, only Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s opinion in Carter
criticizing the Katz test. See id. at 91.
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sign onto it.116 And, as Justice Alito pointed out, Justice Scalia once again
failed to provide very much clarity to what kinds of trespasses do and do
not count as qualifying intrusions upon the enumerated protected
categories.117
Thus, although Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court in Jones,
and the new trespassory investigative intrusion test gained the support of a
majority, it seems likely that the future analytical framework for these sorts
of Fourth Amendment cases will continue to be the traditional Katz test.
Unless the Jones opinion fares better than his other analytical views in
criminal procedure, the perspectives of the concurring opinions of Justices
Sotomayor and Alito probably are poised to become more influential in the
long term.
D. The Court Still Recognizes the Disturbing Implications of Technology.
The technology of the digital age allows us to do things that, just a
decade or two ago, seemed to be the stuff of science fiction—instantaneous
global text communication, real-time video conferencing by satellite phone
to even the remotest locations on the planet, hand-held smartphones with
high-speed Internet access, and social networking that facilitates business
and friendship among people all around the world who might never meet in
person. At the same time, this technology comes at the cost of increasingly
reduced privacy; it is more difficult than ever to keep the details of one’s
life “off the grid,” especially when our daily activities so often leave an
online footprint of website visits, e-commerce purchases, public social
networking posts, and interpersonal communications. And just as this
lessened privacy leaves us vulnerable to malicious private parties and their
frauds, thefts, or even stalking, it also enables government agencies and law
enforcement authorities to monitor a suspect’s activities—and potentially
everyone’s activities at all times—with an ease of effort and minimal
expense that was literally impossible even just a few years ago.
Although the Supreme Court Justices who decided Katz in 1967 could
only have imagined what today’s technology can accomplish, that did not
stop them from worrying about the implications of technological advances
for Fourth Amendment rights.118 Even Justice Harlan, whose famous
concurring opinion formulated the reasonable expectation of privacy test
116. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-53 (2012).
117. See id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
118. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“To read the Constitution
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.”).
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still used today,119 found himself dissenting from the Court’s application of
that test just a few years later in exactly that kind of case.120
This concern has persisted into contemporary cases such as Kyllo, the
famous thermal imager case.121 In his majority opinion in Kyllo, Justice
Scalia addressed the problem by determining, consistent with prior cases,122
that police should be held to the same standard as ordinary members of the
public at large—if the device used in police surveillance was technology in
general public use, then a Fourth Amendment search has not occurred.123
Just as binoculars or a ladder have been used for decades as parts of police
investigations, new technologies which become part of everyday life in
society equally enhance or diminish everyone’s personal privacy, and
therefore do not trigger Fourth Amendment restrictions.
Each of the three opinions in Jones noted the potentially disturbing
implications of advanced technology for reducing privacy. Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court in part justified the new Jones addition to the
definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” by emphasizing the necessity of
ensuring that a lessening of society’s reasonable expectations of privacy
against certain forms of technology does not “eliminate[] rights that
previously existed” with respect to trespassory investigative intrusions upon
an enumerated protected category.124 Justice Sotomayor’s concurring
opinion described some of the investigative capabilities of contemporary
technology and argued that failure to adapt existing doctrines to these new
realities would leave them “ill suited to the digital age.”125 And Justice
Alito’s opinion also emphasized the challenge that new technologies pose
to both empirical underlying social norms of privacy and the normative
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, particularly the extent to which
inexpensive computer technology has made it possible and practical to

119. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that police use of a radio transmitter carried by a cooperating informant to listen
live to a defendant’s conversations with the informant should constitute a Fourth
Amendment “search” under Katz and distinguishing prior “false friend” informant cases
because those cases did not involve police agents overhearing live conversations, instead
involving only the informant’s own memory).
121. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
122. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35 (1988); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
123. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32-34, 39-40.
124. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
125. Id. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

512

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:491

carry out police investigations of extensive breadth, depth, and detail that
were previously inconceivable.126
At the same time, the opinions in Jones also recognized that figuring out
how to address these implications within the boundaries of Fourth
Amendment doctrine is an incredibly difficult intellectual endeavor. No
doubt this played a part in leading Justice Scalia and Justice Alito to trade
strongly worded critiques of each other’s doctrinal analyses.127 Similarly,
both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito discussed the challenging balance
between technological convenience and reduced privacy;128 Justice
Sotomayor emphasized that Katz should depend on a normative analysis of
Fourth Amendment protections that does not equate secrecy with
privacy,129 while Justice Alito noted that social expectations evolve and
may end up tolerating a loss of privacy in service of other values.130 These
doctrinal challenges are especially difficult because technological and
social changes are themselves progressing so quickly. Nevertheless,
acknowledging that the hard questions are hard is an important step in
trying to frame a doctrinal solution.
E. The Court Still Values Judicial Oversight (and Maybe Even Warrants).
Constitutional theory is replete with debates over the appropriate scope
of judicial review in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution.131 Even
apart from academic discourse, the public sphere frequently sees
accusations of “judicial activism” leveled at judicial decisions with which a
politician or commentator disagrees.132 Criminal procedure decisions are
certainly no stranger to such discussions, especially regarding the

126. See id. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
127. See id. at 953-54 (majority opinion); id. at 957-62 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
128. See id. at 955-56 & n* (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962-63 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
129. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
131. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002) (discussing
and critiquing theories of constitutional interpretation suggested by Robert Bork, Justice
Antonin Scalia, Richard Epstein, Akhil Amar, Bruce Ackerman, and Ronald Dworkin).
132. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(invalidating campaign-finance restrictions on corporations); Editorial, Judicial Activism
Inc.: The Supreme Court Tosses out Reasonable Limits on Campaign Finance, WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A20.
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exclusionary rule’s effect of preventing the conviction of concededly guilty
individuals.133
Yet criminal procedure is also quite different from most other areas of
constitutional law in one important respect: by its very nature, criminal
procedure questions are litigated when the Government is the plaintiff—
coming into court to pursue the criminal conviction of a suspect—rather
than the defendant trying to ward off a constitutional challenge to a statute,
regulation, or other government action by an aggrieved citizen plaintiff. It is
therefore much more natural for courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, to view the Constitution as a shield—protecting the
individual from the strong arm of the Government—when the Government
is actively trying to wield its power against the criminal defendant. In that
way, the Fourth Amendment has more similarity to, for example, the
Takings Clause interposed in an eminent domain action or a First
Amendment prior-restraint objection to the Government seeking an
injunction to censor speech before it can be published or broadcast134 than
to a plaintiff seeking to enjoin enforcement of a statute under, for example,
separation of powers principles or the Establishment Clause.135
Consequently, the Court often appears willing to be more aggressive in
enforcing the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal defendants—even at
the cost of the exclusionary rule—compared to a much more deferential
posture under, for example, the Commerce Clause.136
133. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141-42 (2009) (“The principal cost
of applying the [exclusionary] rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous
defendants go free . . . .”).
134. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010) (Takings Clause); Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 737-39 (2005) (prior
restraint doctrine).
135. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011)
(Establishment Clause); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (separation of powers).
136. Compare Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (imposing Fourth Amendment
restrictions on the authority of police to search automobiles incident to the arrest of the
driver), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (imposing Fourth Amendment
restrictions on police use of thermal imager technology to investigate a home), with United
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (upholding Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause to authorize the civil commitment of sex offenders after the expiration of
their criminal sentences), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause to criminalize home-grown marijuana for personal
medicinal use even if it is lawful under state law). Occasionally, Fourth Amendment rights
are litigated in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the individual is the civil plaintiff
and government agencies or actors are the civil defendants, but the fact patterns in these
cases still mirror the factual posture of criminal cases and the exclusionary rule. In either
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The Court’s willingness to assert the importance of judicial review on
Fourth Amendment issues has its roots in cases well before the Warren
Court’s dramatic expansion of criminal procedure case law in the 1960s.137
Perhaps the most famous explanation of the need for judicial oversight of
police investigative tactics comes from the 1948 decision in Johnson v.
United States:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption
that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in
making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment
to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one’s
own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the
law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.138
All three opinions in Jones reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to
judicial review in Fourth Amendment cases. Justice Sotomayor’s
concurring opinion overtly raised concerns about executive branch abuse of
power as a reason for rigorous judicial oversight of individual rights.139
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court emphasized that neither the
situation, the Government has actively and affirmatively engaged in a search or seizure
toward the person, who is then reactively invoking the Fourth Amendment to remedy the
alleged violation (either defensively by the exclusionary rule, if the Government proceeded
with a criminal prosecution, or offensively by a § 1983 action, if not).
137. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379444 (2000).
138. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (emphases added) (footnotes omitted).
139. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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development of contemporary judicial case law nor the inexorable march of
technology available to law enforcement should be permitted to abrogate
the protections originally afforded to the people by the Fourth Amendment
at the time of its adoption.140 And while Justice Alito’s concurring-in-thejudgment opinion for four Justices called upon the legislative branch to
enact statutory rules governing the using of GPS surveillance devices, just
as Congress did for wiretapping technology a generation earlier, his opinion
also emphasized that the Court must not shrink from its duty to enforce
Fourth Amendment rights.141 As the Court confronts more complicated
cases in the future—both in terms of the sophistication of the technology
involved and the conceptual difficulty of framing and applying doctrinal
tests—it is reassuring to see that the Court remains grounded in this
important principle of Fourth Amendment law.
Finally, although the so-called “warrant requirement” sometimes seems
to have more exceptions than controlling effect,142 Jones also contained a
reminder of the principle’s continuing significance under the Fourth
Amendment. As noted above, the Jones case only came before the Court
because the GPS surveillance had not been conducted pursuant to a valid
warrant.143 Had the police used a warrant, there would have been no Fourth
Amendment controversy to litigate. And while Justice Alito conceded that
the Katz analysis in his concurring opinion did not provide police with a
bright line rule about when GPS surveillance is a Fourth Amendment
“search” and when it is not, he concluded his opinion by emphasizing the
default rule—when in doubt, get a warrant.144
The foundational guidance of Johnson v. United States apparently has
some legs to it after all. Although the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement often delegate to police the decision of whether to search or
seize in the first instance, subject to post-hoc judicial review in a motion to
suppress, getting judicial preclearance in advance with a warrant is still the

140. See id. at 950-53 (majority opinion).
141. See id. at 962-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Peter Swire, A
Reasonableness Approach to Searches After the Jones GPS Tracking Case, 64 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 57, 58 (2012) (“[T]he reasonableness doctrine offers the best opportunity to respond
to the Justices’ concern about unconstrained discretion in high-tech searches. Longstanding
precedents under this doctrine require ‘minimization’ of intrusive surveillance and
procedural checks against standardless or discriminatory surveillance.”).
142. See generally 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 11, § 10.01[B]-[C] (discussing
conceptual debate over the “warrant requirement” and its numerous exceptions).
143. See supra Part II.
144. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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safer bet for police.145 And this is particularly true in areas of doctrinal
uncertainty. Jones, then, reaffirmed the best practice for law enforcement to
follow—when in doubt, ask a judge.
IV. The Questions
While the Jones decision provided some interesting answers, it also left
several significant questions open for the future. On one level, of course,
the Court understandably was reluctant to wade into difficult issues when a
simpler, more concise analysis could resolve the case. The Court has a long
tradition of avoiding advisory opinions and a recent practice of often
writing minimalist opinions tailored to the facts before it, and it generally
avoids expansive dicta in controlling opinions.146 On the other hand, by
punting so many important principles to subsequent cases, the Court gave
very little guidance to lower courts or law enforcement about what kind of
analytical approach to use when confronting the Fourth Amendment
implications of high-tech investigations. The three biggest questions left
open by Jones all relate to how technological advances continue to change
both society and the law.
A. When Do Mosaics, Data Mining, and Other Forms of Technological
Information Aggregation Constitute “Searches”?
Perhaps the greatest conceptual challenge presented by Jones arose from
the clash between two competing visions of how to describe the product of
the Government’s month-long GPS surveillance. Each perspective was
highly persuasive in its own right, making the Court’s task all the more
difficult.
On one hand, both common sense and the Court’s precedent in Knotts
and Karo validated the proposition that a person’s openly visible
movements on public roads are not “private” in either the colloquial or legal
145. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid search
warrant, later deemed defective, because the officers executing the warrant reasonably relied
on a magistrate’s approval of the warrant).
146. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“When the federal judicial power
is invoked to pass upon the validity of actions by the Legislative and Executive Branches of
the Government, the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers
prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal courts to the role assigned them by
Article III.”). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Marc McAllister, Dicta Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
161 (2011).
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sense.147 Even elementary school students learning the basics of
multiplication know that a million times zero is still zero—so if each
particular act of public travel is not private, neither is an accumulation of
those acts. Under this view, it should make no doctrinal difference whether
the police were manually tracking an emitted radio signal in Knotts or
sitting at a computer checking a GPS data log in Jones. In either situation,
the information being examined was the suspect’s public movement, and
therefore it should not have any Fourth Amendment privacy protection.
On the other hand, common sense and the foundational values of
American history and political philosophy also validated the proposition
that there is a significant normative difference between the Government’s
observation of isolated individual acts, like a police officer pulling over a
speeding driver caught red-handed, and an Orwellian “Big Brother”
environment in which the Government constantly watches everyone all the
time.148 In 2012, every American over the age of forty grew up during the
Cold War149 and intuitively understood that there is a very meaningful
distinction between the way American law enforcement officers are
supposed to build a criminal case and the way the Soviet-era KGB gathered
and maintained extensive dossiers on millions of people. It is no
coincidence that such totalitarian regimes often are called “police states”
because of their pervasive monitoring of their citizens—and everyone is
familiar with the cliché that a whole can be greater than the sum of its parts.
Under this perspective, then, there is an important distinction between
Knotts and Jones.150 In Knotts, the police used technology to reduce their
error rate in real time, simply to make it less likely that the suspect would

147. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-14 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
148. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The net result is that
GPS monitoring . . . may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way
that is inimical to democratic society.’” (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))).
149. All nine Justices on the United States Supreme Court went to law school, and first
learned the constitutional law of criminal procedure, during the Cold War. See Biographies
of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supreme
court.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (noting years of law school
graduation, first legal employment, or both, for each Justice). In fact, Justice Kagan is the
only Justice to have attended law school in the 1980s. Id.
150. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 n.6 (“Knotts . . . reserved the question whether
‘different constitutional principles may be applicable’ to ‘dragnet-type law enforcement
practices’ of the type that GPS tracking made possible here.” (emphasis added) (quoting
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284)); see also id. at 956 n.* (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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slip pursuit while they were actually in the process of physically tracking
him.151 By contrast, the police in Jones built a month-long dossier of all of
the suspect’s movements without any need for active participation by any
human being during the surveillance.152 In the scholarly literature, this
view—that the aggregation of information might be covered by a
reasonable expectation of privacy even though each particular discrete bit
of data on its own would not—became known as the “mosaic theory” of
Fourth Amendment protection.153
Both of these perspectives found support in the academic commentary on
the Jones case specifically, as well as in broader analyses of Fourth
Amendment issues, the briefing in Jones, and the Justices’ questions from
the bench at oral argument.154 Professor Orin Kerr, for example, is a
prominent critic of the mosaic theory and argued that the Government
should win Jones because its surveillance only recorded public
movements.155 Professor Wayne Logan, by contrast, has written in support
of mosaic theory and urged its expansion to other forms of pervasive
government monitoring, as well.156 Needless to say, there are good
arguments on both sides.
It is not surprising, then, that the Court found a way to decide Jones
without treading deeply into the intellectual thicket created by these
contrasting perspectives. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court relegated the
problem to two paragraphs at the end of the opinion, noting that there was
no reason to reach those questions because the new trespassory
investigative intrusion test dispensed with the case cleanly.157 Justice
151. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
152. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
153. See, e.g., Madelaine Virginia Ford, Comment, Mosaic Theory and the Fourth
Amendment: How Jones Can Save Privacy in the Face of Evolving Technology, 19 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1351, 1359 (2011); Benjamin M. Ostrander, Note, The “Mosaic
Theory” and Fourth Amendment Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733, 1734-35 (2011).
154. See Brief for the United States, supra note 39; Reply Brief for the United States,
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 5094951; Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 23.
155. See Kerr, supra note 7; Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of
Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007).
156. See Wayne A. Logan, “Mosaic Theory” and Megan’s Laws, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVO 95; see also Forbes, supra note 7; Erin Smith Dennis, Note, A Mosaic Shield:
Maynard, the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 737 (2011); Herbert, supra note 7.
157. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54.
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Sotomayor’s opinion also allotted only a few paragraphs to the issue,
expressing in dicta sentiments basically in accord with the mosaic theory.158
She noted the ominous implications and chilling effects of permitting the
Government to build dossiers on countless Americans, especially without
judicial oversight.159 Justice Alito’s opinion devoted the most space to
discussing how the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test should be
applied to these sorts of situations.160 In particular, Justice Alito emphasized
that the GPS technology had essentially overridden the traditional practical
limits on the scope of law enforcement investigations, making it possible to
conduct extensive monitoring at minimal cost in dollars and manpower.161
And like Justice Sotomayor, he agreed that Americans do not ordinarily
expect the police to engage in extensive dossier-building except in
unusually important investigations.162 Yet Justice Alito declined to provide
specific guidance on where to draw the line between a permissible ordinary
investigation and an impermissible mosaic investigation, whether in terms
of its duration, its breadth or depth of scope, or the seriousness of the
crime.163 Thus, although at least five Justices expressly gave their
imprimatur to at least some version of the mosaic theory,164 the Jones
opinions gave very little guidance to lawyers, lower court judges, or law
enforcement about the actual functional boundaries of this Fourth
Amendment principle.
Some amount of basic information-gathering is readily anticipated and
accepted in American society, and conducting it consequently does not
constitute a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.165 On the other
hand, at some point the sheer quantity of information gathered and

158. See id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). This analysis is dicta because Justice
Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s analysis in full. See id. at 955, 957.
159. See id. at 956.
160. See id. at 961-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
161. See id. at 963-64.
162. See id. at 963.
163. See id. at 964; see also id. at 954 (majority opinion) (criticizing lack of doctrinal
clarity in Justice Alito’s Katz analysis).
164. Three Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Thomas—joined
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the court without separately explaining their views, but they also
did not join Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion. See id. at 948 (majority opinion); id. at
954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Without additional explanation from these Justices, it is
impossible to determine whether they do not support mosaic theory, or instead they simply
chose not to opine on broader issues than necessary to decide the Jones case, as Justice
Sotomayor did. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
165. See supra Part II.
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analyzed—especially if the investigative process is automated
electronically—may pass beyond accepted social norms to create a
reasonable expectation that such a “search” will not occur except in
compliance with the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.166 Going
forward, then, there is much left for the Court to address and resolve in
future cases. One aspect of the Court’s analysis will involve fitting in Jones
and mosaic theory to the broader lines of precedent defining what
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.”
The line of precedent most closely related to Jones finds its root in the
Katz decision itself, where the Court declared that information which a
person “knowingly exposes to the public” is not shielded from discovery by
the Fourth Amendment.167 Although the Court ruled that the contents of
Katz’s phone call were “searched” when the police used a listening device
to snoop on his half of the conversation, Katz indisputably would have had
no valid claim that the Government had “searched” him simply by
observing his presence inside a glass-enclosed phone booth on a public
street at the time he made the call.168 In both Knotts and Karo, the Court
held that the movements of vehicles on public roads were knowingly
exposed to the public in the same way.169 In other cases, the Court applied
this principle to conclude that, among others, open fields and curbside trash
qualified as information exposed to the public and, therefore, the police had
not conducted a Fourth Amendment “search” by inspecting them.170 In
these cases, the information was exposed to the public at large—that is,
everyone who happened to be at the relevant location would have been able
to see the same things the police officer saw. Both the mosaic theory and
the opinions in Jones recognize that a relatively small number of discrete
observations of these kinds of publicly disclosed information are clearly
permissible without triggering any Fourth Amendment scrutiny; the
question remains where to draw the line determining how much is too
much.
166. See supra Part II.
167. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (“What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”); see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (requiring
subjective expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment protections to attach).
168. See id. at 352 (majority opinion).
169. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-14 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
170. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37-38 (1988) (curbside trash); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173-74, 184 (1984) (open fields).
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Importantly, an interesting nuance has lingered throughout this line of
cases regarding the nature of the public accessibility to the information
necessary to deem it to have been exposed to the public. In earlier
decisions, the Court framed the question in terms of whether the
information was hypothetically accessible to members of the public. For
example, the Court used this reasoning to justify its conclusion that Oliver’s
“open fields” (even when enclosed by a fence and guarded by a posted “No
Trespassing” sign) and Greenwood’s curbside trash were exposed to the
public.171 In later cases, however, the Court reframed the question as
whether the information was ordinarily accessible to the public in the
regular course of everyday life. For example, in Riley, a 1989 case
involving a helicopter flyover of a residential back yard, five Justices
concluded that the proper analysis was not whether a flyover was possible
(which it clearly was), but rather the frequency with which flyovers actually
occurred (which was not established in the record).172 By the time of Bond,
a 2000 case involving an officer’s hand-squeezing of a commercial bus
passenger’s duffel bag, a seven-Justice majority held that the officer’s
action constituted a “search” because, while incidental contact with luggage
was to be expected, such a direct investigatory manipulation of the duffel
bag was not within the ordinary course of public interactions.173
Justice Alito’s Katz analysis in Jones, supported by four other Justices,174
did not frame the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in these terms
or cite these cases, but his reasoning was entirely consistent with them.175
Just as the decisions in Riley176 and Bond177 defined reasonable expectations
of privacy in terms of what members of the public ordinarily do, Justice
Alito’s analysis in Jones asked what kind of duration, extensiveness, error
rate, and level of detail police surveillance ordinarily involves.178 While he
noted that Americans would expect an investigation of exceptional
171. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37-38; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173-74.
172. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452-55 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 456-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336-39 (2000).
174. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito’s Katz
analysis).
175. See id. at 963-64 & n.10 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
176. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 452-55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 45661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 337-39.
178. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963-64 & n.10 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see
also id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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magnitude for crimes of great seriousness, social norms and the Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment previously were grounded in
reliance on constraints of budget and manpower to limit how aggressive the
police could be in their efforts to solve more mundane crimes.179 If such
resource constraints are no longer present, Justice Alito acknowledged, then
the Court may need to adapt its doctrinal principles to this new reality.180
Thus, the Court in Jones appeared to indicate that it now will take
seriously the distinction offered by the mosaic theory—that the discovery of
basic information routinely revealed to the public at large lacks
constitutional significance, but the building of an extensive dossier far
beyond the scope of what other members of the public would ordinarily
acquire about each other is a “search” governed by the Fourth
Amendment.181 While a bright-line rule is not readily apparent from Jones,
cases like Riley and Bond provide further support for the development of a
doctrinal standard centered on consideration of how the public reasonably
expects ordinary police investigations to proceed.
But the problem of technological information aggregation extends
beyond just the information that everyone exposes to everyone else in the
course of daily life—it also encompasses information shared selectively
with only certain other persons or entities. Such information runs the gamut
from online transactions with Internet vendors like Amazon.com or credit
card purchases of gasoline at the local filling station to word searches
entered into Google’s search engine or websites visited through Internet
access from a service provider. This information is not exposed to the
public at large in any meaningful sense, but it is also by definition not
entirely private precisely because it has been shared with another.
Under the “third-party doctrine” line of cases, no Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy exists for this information, and therefore no Fourth
Amendment “search” occurs when the police obtain the information from
the other party to the information exchange.182 In Miller, for example, the
Court held that neither probable cause nor a warrant was required to obtain
records of the defendant’s account transactions from his bank,
notwithstanding the business confidentiality of such records, because the
defendant by necessity revealed those transactions to the bank when they
were processed through his accounts.183 Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland,
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id. at 963-64 & n.10 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
Id. at 440-43.
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the Court held that no “search” occurred when the police obtained, with the
phone company’s assistance, the pen register data of the outgoing phone
numbers dialed from the defendant’s home phone, which the police then
used as evidence to support the finding of probable cause for the search
warrant that was ultimately executed at the defendant’s home.184 In recent
years, the lower courts have applied this same rationale to, among other
situations, addressing information on emails, IP addresses visited on the
Internet, and purchases made with credit and debit cards.185
Just as with information exposed to the public at large, the use of
information disclosed to third parties presents a particularly challenging
problem when it is aggregated and then thoroughly analyzed—a practice
often referred to as “data mining.”186 The practice of data mining is
controversial enough when private companies engage in the practice with
their own proprietary information data banks gathered from customers,
account holders, or other service users, as companies like Google and
Target have learned to their chagrin.187 But under the third-party doctrine,
all of this information is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment and the
police can acquire the data and mine it without any individualized suspicion
or any need to seek a warrant beforehand.188
184. 442 U.S. 735, 742-45 (1979).
185. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every
federal court to address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to an internet
provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.”); see also
Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010) (to and from addressing data from emails);
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008) (IP addresses visited); United States
v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1993) (credit card statements).
186. See, e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging
Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261 (2008).
187. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at
30 (discussing controversial data mining of customer purchases by Target, which resulted in
coupons sent to her by mail revealing a teenage girl’s pregnancy to her parents before she
had told them); Sam Grobart, Google’s New Data-Sharing, and How to Deflect It, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at B2 (discussing Google’s controversial new “privacy policy” for
users, which provides for increased data mining of user usage).
188. The raw data itself would be unprotected by the Fourth Amendment due to the thirdparty doctrine. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. Were the police to seek already-mined data from
a company, the request might run up against legal principles such as trade secret law, patent
law, or other legal shields for proprietary technology like data-mining algorithms. Such
obstacles might be overcome with a protective order or similar procedure, or by requesting
access only to the outputs of the proprietary data-mining rather than the processes
themselves. In any event, due to the third-party doctrine, there would be no Fourth
Amendment protection against law enforcement’s acquisition of proprietary data-mining
analysis of information gathered about suspects by third parties. Those suspects also
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Consequently, the information deemed unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment due to the third-party doctrine presents the same conceptual
issues in addressing technological aggregation and analysis as information
knowingly exposed to the public at large. In the latter, the police can gather
the information themselves; in the former, they obtain it from the third
party. In both situations, the Court must determine the point at which the
sheer quantity of information becomes so great—or the prospect of highly
specific data-mined analysis becomes so disturbing—that the protections of
the Fourth Amendment will be triggered.
As noted above, it seems unlikely that the Court will be able to adopt a
specific, bright-line rule to resolve the balance between permissible routine
investigation and impermissible Orwellian dossier-building. This is
particularly true because different technologies function in different ways,
and they cannot all be governed by the same bright-line rule. For example,
even if the Court were to declare that GPS surveillance for more than two
weeks constitutes a “search” no matter the surrounding circumstances, such
a rule would have no utility in addressing aggregation of public movements
from data gathered by red-light cameras, business security cameras, or toll
road E-ZPass devices. Likewise, a bright-line rule requiring the police to
obtain a warrant before examining more than two weeks’ worth of IP
addresses visited from a computer would have no utility in addressing more
intermittent Amazon.com purchases or more frequent text messaging
delivery information.
Whether the information is gathered by police observation or from third
parties, Jones leaves unresolved the doctrinal solution for this exceedingly
complex balance. Some amount of data-gathering or data mining is
tolerable, but too much is intolerable. While a totality of the circumstances
standard would not be at all unusual among the Court’s Fourth Amendment
doctrines,189 it also would not provide very much guidance to the lower
courts or law enforcement about when the line between constitutionality
and unconstitutionality has been crossed. Yet, such a multi-factor balancing
test may be the best the Court can do—and it would certainly be better,
from a civil liberties perspective, than having no doctrinal limit at all.
presumably would lack Fourth Amendment standing to object even to a brazenly
unconstitutional search of the third party’s data. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727 (1980).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-76 (2002) (totality of
circumstances test for “reasonable suspicion”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-38
(1983) (totality of circumstances test for “probable cause”); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 211 (1979) (totality of circumstances test for informal arrest).
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B. Will Technological Change Lead the Court to Alter the Third-Party
Doctrine and Adopt a Broader Definition of “Searches”?
Even apart from the doctrinal challenges posed by information
aggregation and data mining generally, the third-party doctrine itself may
become a candidate for doctrinal revision in the face of the rapid
technological change of the digital and Internet age.190 Although Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence was the only opinion in Jones to expressly raise
this possibility, and no other Justice openly signed on to her generalized
suggestions relating to an issue not presented on the facts of the case,191 her
brief discussion of the doctrine nevertheless indicated the potential breadth
of the Court’s impending conceptual struggles.192
As society becomes increasingly interconnected online, far more
information than ever before is being shared with others, whether socially
or commercially. Some of this information, of course, is exposed to the
world at large, such as a public blog, an unprotected Twitter account’s
tweets, or the viewable-by-everyone portions of a Facebook page. Much of
it, though, is clearly “non-public,” such as purchases from Internet retailers
or subscriptions to pay-for-access websites. When information is willingly
shared with another party, the act of sharing often carries with it the
expectation that the information will not be further shared with anyone else,
at least without the information-giver’s permission, either at the time the
information is given or later on. With or without a contractual or terms-ofservice promise of confidentiality, this kind of non-public information
sharing quite easily fits within the colloquial word usage that someone was
told something “in private” in the sense that he was expected to keep it “just
between us.” Under the third-party doctrine, however, all of this “non190. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011); see also Richard A. Epstein,
Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199 (2009); Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A
Response to Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229 (2009); Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009); Erin Murphy, The
Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009).
191. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was not joined by any other Justice. See United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
192. See id. at 955, 957. Because the surveillance conducted in Jones involved a GPS
device the police physically attached to the vehicle, the issue of using pre-installed GPS
technology to track a vehicle or smartphone was not presented on the facts before the
Court—but Justice Sotomayor noted that the implications of the third-party doctrine in such
a scenario were clear. See id.
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public” information is completely unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.
Yet as Justice Sotomayor suggested, it is hard to believe that societal norms
actually contemplate that all of this information is fair game for the police
to investigate and gather with impunity—without the requirement of any
individualized suspicion at all, much less probable cause or a warrant—
simply because it was shared with someone else “in private” in that
colloquial sense.193
Importantly, how to characterize the Fourth Amendment implications of
information sharing in the digital age will be a normative judgment by the
Court, not simply an empirical assessment of the practical treatment of
information in daily life. Since the origins of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test in the Katz decision itself, the Court has emphasized this
distinction.194 Of course, this does not mean that the actual views and
behaviors of the American people are irrelevant to the consideration of the
scope of legal protections; the more definitive the public’s perception of
information as “public knowledge” or “nobody’s business,” the more likely
it is the Court will conform the normative Fourth Amendment significance
of law enforcement’s attempt to gain access to that information to those
societal views. On the other hand, Justices have worried since the early
years of Katz that society’s changing views on privacy might lead to the
reduction of the scope of Fourth Amendment rights—particularly if the
Government’s own behavior affects the public’s perceptions.195
Interestingly, Americans have become accustomed to watching television
police procedurals in which detectives routinely “pull the LUDs” on a
suspect very early in the investigation, obtaining a comprehensive list of
phone calls without first getting a warrant.196 But does this apparent
comfort level with the consequences of Smith as to phone calls necessarily
193. See id. at 957.
194. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
195. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present. Since it is the task of the
law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite
the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon
society.”).
196. The acronym LUD stands for “local usage details,” another name for the “pen
register” information analyzed in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). See, e.g.,
Immunity Demand for Telecoms Raises Questions, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 2007, at 14A
(“Anyone who has ever watched Law & Order: SVU knows how easy it is for police to get
the bad guys’ LUDs—‘local usage details,’ better known as telephone calling records.”); see
also Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
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carry over to the public’s views of their own smartphone activities and
home Internet usage?
Thus, for example, the fact that in recent years the police have been
obtaining—without warrants or probable cause—the cooperation of Internet
service providers to pull the business records of IP addresses visited or files
downloaded by a customer,197 and that there has not yet been a backlash of
court decisions granting motions to suppress the fruits of such cooperation
nor a massive public outcry against such police activity, does not resolve
the normative question. The lack of successful court challenges to date is
consistent with the reasoning of Miller and Smith,198 but lower court rulings
have not somehow definitively entrenched this police investigative
technique as a constitutionally permissible tactic that is not a “search” for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Rather, it only means that the lower courts
have not moved aggressively to redefine the third-party doctrine prior to
indications from the Court to move in that direction. Likewise, the public at
large very well may not be aware enough of the extent of the use of such
tactics—or even of their existence—to realize that such use may already
have risen to a problematic level.199 The Court must approach the thirdparty doctrine from a normative perspective, asking whether individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this particular kind of
interaction with this specific kind of third party sufficient to trigger the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. As Justice Sotomayor suggested, it
is possible that the dramatic increase in “non-public” information sharing in
the Internet era will lead the Court to reconsider the third-party doctrine and
hold that the mere revelation of information to a third party does not
completely abrogate any Fourth Amendment protection against law
enforcement investigations.200
Similarly, the Court need not view the doctrinal fate of the third-party
doctrine as a binary, all-or-nothing choice. Police acquisition of “nonpublic” information given to a third party could be found to never constitute
a “search,” or always constitute a “search,” or something in between. The
current doctrinal test, grounded in Smith and Miller, has been applied as a
bright-line rule to defeat the existence of any reasonable expectation of
privacy in any information shared with others.201 One alternative,
197. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 185.
198. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
199. Cf. supra note 187 (citing articles discussing lack of public awareness of full extent
of private corporations’ data mining of customer or user information).
200. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
201. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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obviously, is the opposite bright-line rule—abolishing the third-party
doctrine entirely, such that information shared with a third party (or some
small number of third parties) is treated as fully private for constitutional
purposes unless and until it is exposed to the public at large (or some
defined large number of people).202 But there is no conceptual principle that
would preclude an alternative version of the third-party doctrine which
operates as a legal standard, rather than a rule, giving the doctrine nuance
rather than definitiveness.
For example, just as information aggregation and data mining raise
concerns on their own merits, the definition of the third-party doctrine
could itself be revised to incorporate a similar principle. Under Katz,
whether a “search” occurred is determined by evaluating whether the
particular police investigative activity used violated society’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.203 Viewed through this lens, a normative and
202. See articles cited supra note 190. Even if the third-party doctrine was eliminated,
one limitation on the extent of Fourth Amendment protection for information shared with
others might remain—the false friend doctrine. Under that doctrine, no Fourth Amendment
“search” occurred if a third party to whom information voluntarily was given by the
defendant chose to reveal that information to the police. See, e.g., United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 752-54 (1971) (informant wore radio transmitter to allow police to eavesdrop
on conversations between informant and defendant); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
302-03 (1966) (cooperating informant had conversation with defendant, then reported
contents of conversation to police); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-40 (1963)
(undercover law enforcement officer covertly recorded conversations between officer and
defendant). The false friend doctrine depends on a volitional act by the third party to choose
to assist the police. Cf. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978) (holding that
exclusionary rule did not bar trial testimony of witness whose identity was discovered as
fruit of an unconstitutional search because witness’s own volitional choice to testify broke
causal connection between unconstitutional search and witness’s trial testimony); Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974) (holding that exclusionary rule did not bar trial
testimony of witness whose identity was discovered from defendant’s confession obtained in
violation of Miranda doctrine because additional deterrence from excluding it was
outweighed by value of permitting use of reliable evidence). Thus, eliminating the thirdparty doctrine would not prohibit third parties, whether individuals or companies, from
choosing to provide relevant evidence to law enforcement; on the other hand, doing so
would allow the defendant to suppress the information if it was obtained without the
cooperation of the third party, such as by compelling the monitoring of a smartphone’s
location over the objection of the phone carrier. In other words, eliminating the third-party
doctrine would restore the defendant’s Fourth Amendment standing to contest such an action
by the police because the defendant now would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information held in the third party’s hands as against its acquisition by the police—
unless and until the police obtained the volitional cooperation of that party under the false
friend doctrine.
203. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
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empirical argument could be made that the average person might
reasonably expect that a small quantity of information about him might
“leak” to the police from the third parties with whom he deals in his daily
life, while simultaneously not reasonably expecting massive “data dumps”
of information to be given to law enforcement. Framed another way, it
might be viewed as one thing for the police to request the current location
of a specific smartphone, the timestamp of the most recent email sent from
one particular account to another specified account, or the duration of a
single call known to have been placed from one phone number to another,
and viewed as another thing entirely for the police to request an itemized
log of every recorded location of a smartphone for a month in fifteensecond intervals, or a comprehensive list of the addressing information of
every email sent and received by an account, or a full log of every phone
call made from a phone number and their durations. The doctrine easily
could be constructed so that the former request is not a “search” but the
latter request is.
Finally, the potential ramifications of the extant version of the third-party
doctrine in the Internet age could even lead the Court to reframe—or at
least rephrase—the Katz test itself. In her concurring opinion in Jones,
Justice Sotomayor noted that “societal expectations . . . can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”204 But
perhaps a reasonable expectation of “privacy” is not even the right choice
of words. Are the relevant categories “public information” (a blog), “nonpublic information” (bank transactions), and “secret information” (a diary)?
Or is the true distinction between information the police should be able to
get just because they want it and information the police should need a
warrant to get? In an interconnected, online society, this latter distinction
may be very salient—while not lining up with traditional modes of thinking
about information. Thus, rather than asking, as a Katz analysis does,
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court could
reframe the test in overtly normative terms—asking whether individuals
have a reasonable expectation that this particular kind of interaction with
this specific kind of third party is something the police should be allowed to
investigate with impunity, or instead that the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment should be triggered before the investigation can proceed.

204. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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C. Could Information, Rather Than Intrusion, Become the Core Concept in
Defining What Constitutes a “Search”?
In interpreting and applying the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable “searches,” the Court must decide what it means for a person
to have been “searched” by a government agent. Is it possible that rapid
advances in technology could not merely reshape Fourth Amendment
doctrines on the edges—such as a new principle to address aggregation and
data mining or revisiting the third-party doctrine—but lead to a wholesale
rethinking of the Court’s analytical approach to defining a “search”?
So far, the Court has examined this issue through the lens of the concept
of intrusion. Prior to Katz, a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred when
the police intruded upon a property right; Jones reaffirmed that at least
certain kinds of property-rights intrusions continue to constitute “searches”
today.205 Since Katz, a “search” has occurred when the police intrude into a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and all three opinions in Jones
reaffirmed that Katz doctrines continues to govern those situations.206 In
both conceptual visions of the Fourth Amendment, the dispositive features
are (1) a protected interest of the individual and (2) an action by the police
to intrude into that interest.
But what if, instead of asking what a “search” looks like, we ask what a
“search” is for? That is, instead of asking how police “search,” we ask why
police “search.” The answer, of course, is that police investigations—and
searches in the colloquial, not doctrinal, usage of the word—are about
obtaining evidence, whether physical items, electronic data, or other kinds
of information that will help solve a crime or secure a conviction.
The rise of high-speed personal computing, digital technology, and the
Internet have exponentially increased the amount of information that
Americans create, consume, and share every day.207 In this new reality, the
205. See supra Part III.A.
206. See supra Part III.A.
207. See, e.g., Lauren Ann Ross, A Comparative Critique to U.S. Courts’ Approach to EDiscovery in Foreign Trials, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 313, 319 (2012) (“Discovery has
evolved from boxes of hard-copy documents in a file room into a complex labyrinth of
[electronically storied information] produced by internet communications and office
automation. Globally, the amount of data is increasing exponentially. Between 2004 and
2007, the average amount of information stored by a Fortune 1000 company quintupled,
while the average amount of data produced by American midsize companies increased fiftyfold.” (footnotes omitted)); Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage,
63 FED. COMM. L.J. 67 (2010) (describing challenges posed by rapid growth of Internet
usage for information-sharing).
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kind and quantity of information acquired often may matter far more than
how the information was acquired. Someone whose emails or SMS text
messages were published for all to read on the Internet, or whose intimate
photos or video chats were seen by unintended persons, may suffer
comparable emotional anguish whether the exposure was carried out
through a friend’s betrayal or by an unknown computer hacker. Likewise, a
person whose money is stolen through theft of a password or a bank
account personal identification number may endure the same financial
hardships regardless of whether the fraud was committed by a friend,
relative, or total stranger. In time, social norms may come to view
interactions with police in much the same way. The affront felt toward the
inappropriateness of a law enforcement investigation may follow not so
much from how the police learned what they know, but what they know and
how much they know. A blatant hacking of a smartphone may be seen as
minor if only a trivial amount of insignificant information is acquired, while
building a detailed dossier of thousands of pieces of aggregated data may be
seen as deeply troubling even though the discrete data itself was gathered
by rather innocuous and unobtrusive methods.
Thus, perhaps the Internet age will lead society—and the Court—to
perceive that a person has been “searched” for Fourth Amendment purposes
because of the kind and extent of information that the government has
learned about him, rather than the particular investigative techniques and
tactics used to acquire the information. Interestingly, the seeds of such a
doctrinal shift may already have been sown in the concurring opinions in
Jones. Although Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s trespassory
intrusion analysis for purposes of resolving the case narrowly, she noted
that non-trespassory, non-intrusive methods already exist to accomplish
exactly the same surveillance performed by the trespassory GPS device in
the actual case.208 Justice Alito also recognized the implications of such
technologies, but he rejected the trespassory intrusion analysis in part
because the real danger posed by the police investigation was not the
attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, but rather the month-long
monitoring of all of the suspect’s public movements.209
Such a fundamental shift in doctrinal foundations, of course, would
topple the entire edifice of current Fourth Amendment “search” definition
doctrine and require building a new doctrinal structure in its place. From

208. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
209. See id. at 961, 963 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the perspective of today’s entrenched Katz test, though, it is hard to even
imagine the contours of such a reinvented Fourth Amendment.
V. Conclusion
By limiting its decision in Jones to a concise application of a narrow
doctrinal test, the Court punted the most conceptually important—and
conceptually difficult—Fourth Amendment questions implicated by law
enforcement surveillance and information gathering in the digital age.
Going forward, the Court inevitably will be confronted with future cases
presenting all manner of challenges to electronic and Internet
investigations, and the Justices may very well find it necessary to make
significant modifications to Fourth Amendment doctrines to take account of
an increasingly interconnected technological society. Nevertheless, until
those cases come before the Court, it is important not to lose sight of the
answers the Court did provide in Jones, both for resolving cases in the
lower courts in the meantime and for considering how the Justices might
approach these later cases when the day arrives. On first blush, the
narrowness of Jones may seem to make it an insignificant way station on
the road to more definitive rulings—but it turns out there may be more to
Jones after all.
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